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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORTS: THE LONG LOST
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 701(E)
JOHN

T.

COCKLIN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

T

HE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT of 1938's Title VII, Section
701(e) (701(e)) has generated a large number of cases and
law review articles for what is essentially a small footnote to the
federal laws concerning aircraft safety and investigation.1 The
attention is understandable. Section 701 (e) as currently codified reads: "[n]o part of a report of the [National Transportation Safety] Board, related to an accident or an investigation of
an accident, may be admitted into evidence or used in a civil
action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the
report. ' 2 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB or
Board) reports are the product of exhaustive investigations into
aircraft accidents.' To carry out its investigations, the NTSB has
unique access to evidence including testimony and wreckage.4
NTSB investigators perform analysis of the evidence such as
micro-coding of cockpit communication and metallurgical tests
on wreckage. 5 The reports include the facts of the accident as
well as NTSB opinions and conclusions concerning the acci* John T. Cocklin has served thirteen years as the Government Information
Librarian at Dartmouth College.
I Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 6.01, § 701(e), 52 Stat. 973, 1013 ("[N]o
part of any report or reports of the [Air Safety] Board or the [Civil Aeronautics]
Authority relating to any accident, or the investigation thereof, shall be admitted
as evidence or used in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter
mentioned in such report or reports.").
2 49 U.S.C. § 1154(b) (2006).
3 NTSB, AVIATION INVESTIGATION MANUAL: MAJOR TrAM INVESTIGATIONS 28-30
(Nov. 2002), http://www.ntsb.gov/Aviation/Manuals/MajorInvestigationsManual.pdf.
4 See id. at 4, 25, 33-34, 36.
5 See id. at 1.
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dent's causes. 6 They are a potential wealth of evidence for attorneys litigating for, or against, parties involved in the accident,
and attorneys and courts have worked hard over the years to
narrow 701 (e).
This article uncovers the long lost legislative history of 701 (e)7
and reviews the history of 701(e) in the courts. Previous courts
and law review authors (save one) found no direct legislative
history for the section. Notable among these law review authors
were attorneys working for the NTSB and its predecessor agencies: John Simpson in 1950 (Attorney, Bureau of Law, Civil Aeronautics Board), Lawrence Galardi in 1965 (Administrative
Assistant to G. Joseph Minetti, Member of the Civil Aeronautics
Board), C.O. Miller in 1981 (Director, Bureau of Aviation
Safety, NTSB), and Walter Welch in 1982 (U.S. Administrative
Law Judge, Civil Aeronautics Board and NTSB).8 Also notable
was an oft cited law review comment written by Roy Tress
Atwood in 1987. 9 In 1952, however, a second-year law school
student at the University of California named R. Bruce Hoffe
discovered the legislative history of 701 (e).10 His article never
landed on the citation trail and his research sat quietly on the
pages of the California Law Review for fifty years.11 While the
analysis of the legislative history contained herein is entirely the
author's own, credit goes to Hoffe for finding the missing pieces
first.
The point of this article is not to weigh the merits of the
courts' interpretations of the clause, nor is it to advocate for the
courts to reevaluate their interpretations based on the legislative
history. The legal precedents at this point are clearly set, and
courts have given due deference to the NTSB's own interpretation of the statute.1 2 Congress has made minor textual revisions
6 See id. at 44-45.
7 Tansey v. Transcon. & W. Air, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 458, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
8 Lawrence J. Galardi, Use of Civil Aeronautics Board Investigation Materials in
Civil Litigation, 32 BROOK. L. REV. 58 (1965); C.O. Miller, Aviation Accident Investigation: Functional and Legal Perspectives,46J. AR L. & COM. 237 (1981); John W.
Simpson, Use of Aircraft Accident Investigation Information in Actions for Damages, 17
J. AIR L. & COM. 283, 284 (1950); Walter A.T. Welch, Jr. & Judge John E. Faulk,
The Use of Aviation Accident Reports by Civil Litigants: The HistoricalDevelopment of 49
U.S.C. Section 1441(e), 9 PEPP. L. REv. 583 (1982).
9 Roy Tress Atwood, Comment, Admissibility of National Transportation Safety
Board Reports in Civil Air Crash Litigation, 53J. AIR L. & CoM. 469 (1987).
10R. Bruce Hoffe, Evidence: Civil Aeronautics Act Section 701(e): Admissibility of
Opinion Evidence of CAB Investigator, 40 CAL. L. REv. 151, 152-53 (1952).
11 Id.
12 2 AM.

JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 494 (2004).
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to the law five times in seventy years without further clarification
or any indication that the courts were not following congressional intent.1 3 This article merely sheds light on the origin of
701 (e) and indicates that the courts' interpretations of the section were based on something of a legal fiction.
II.

COURT INTERPRETATION-THREE CATEGORIES

In 2003, Easton and Mayer divided the cases involving 701 (e)
into three broad categories. 4 The first category, which they
called the "majority rule," admits facts from NTSB reports into
evidence but not opinions from NTSB reports (fact v. opinion) . The court in Universal Airline, Inc. v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.
allowed the factual testimony of a Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB-the predecessor to the NTSB) investigator into evidence, but not his conclusions or opinions. 6 Another court in
Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., expanded on the Universal decision and allowed the factual portion of a CAB report into evidence, but, again, not the opinions or the conclusions from the
Where Congress, through express delegation or the introduction of
an interpretive gap in a statutory structure, has delegated policymaking authority under a statute to an administrative agency, the
extent of judicial review of the agency's policy determinations is
limited. If a policy determination is not in conflict with the plain
language of the statute, the reviewing court must give deference to
the agency's interpretation of the statute, although the traditional
deference which courts pay to agency interpretation is not to be
applied to alter the clearly expressed intent of Congress. judicial
deference to an agency's interpretation of ambiguous provisions of
a statute it is authorized to implement reflects a sensitivity to the
proper roles of the government's political and judicial branches;
the resolution of ambiguity in a statutory text is often more a question of policy than of law.
Id.
See LEE S. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 19.01[2] (2009).
John F. Easton & Walter Mayer, The Rights of Parties and Civil Litigants in an
NTSB Investigation, 68 J. AIR L. & COM. 205, 219-26 (2003). For another more
recent treatment on the admissibility of accident reports, see Leane Capps Medford and Steven D. Sanfelippo, Admissible or Inadmissible? Getting In-or Keeping
Out-Government Documents in Aviation Cases, 71 J. AIR L. & CoM. 449, 454-58
(2006) ("Thankfully, there is no confusion regarding the admissibility of the
NTSB's conclusions on the probable cause of an accident-they are not
admissible.").
15 Easton & Mayer, supra note 14, at 219-20.
16 188 F.2d 993, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1951). A lengthy discussion of the court's
reasoning in Universal can be found in the Court Interpretation-Initial Majority
Rule Cases section below.
13
14
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report.' 7 From these cases flowed the "majority rule." Lee S.
Kreindler, in his treatise Aviation Accident Law, noted that a long
line of cases followed the Lobel precedent.' 8
In the second category, the "minority rule" cases, the courts
have strictly construed the statute and have allowed no part of
the accident reports into evidence. 19 A string of cases from the
Northern District of Illinois and the Ninth Circuit fill this category. ° Since they are in a very small minority, Kreindler felt
that these cases warranted criticism.2 '
The third and final category of cases followed the District of
Columbia Circuit's ruling in Chiron Corp. v. NTSB based on regulations promulgated by the NTSB. 22 This category is actually a
narrowing of the fact v. opinion majority rule. In 1974, the
NTSB promulgated regulations that allowed the use of investigator's factual accident reports at trial but not the Board's accident report.23 In 1998, the NTSB redefined its accident reports
and formally recognized separate factual reports emanating
from its accident investigations.2 4 The NTSB accident report
could not be allowed as evidence even if only a few pages were
devoted to opinions and conclusions. 25 The factual accident reports prepared for each investigation, however, could be allowed into evidence consistent with the case law. 2 6 The court in
Chiron cited these regulations and allowed the factual accident
17 192 F.2d 217, 220 (2d Cir. 1951) (a discussion of the court's reasoning in
Lobel can be found in the Court Interpretation-Initial "Majority Rule" Cases section below).
18 KREINDLER, supra note 13, at § 19.01[2].
19 Easton & Mayer, supra note 14, at 223.
20 Id. at 223-24. See also Gibson v. NTSB, 118 F.3d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1997);
Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. N. Pac. Grain Growers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1379,
1384-85 (9th Cir. 1985); Benna v. Reeder Flying Serv., Inc., 578 F.2d 269, 271
(9th Cir. 1978); In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, 780 F. Supp. 1207,
1208-09 (N.D. Ill. 1991) ("The unequivocal wording of Sections [701(e)] and
1903(c) appears to leave no room for creative interpretation. The language, on
its face, states an absolute bar to the use of NTSB reports in the present action.").
21 KREINDLER, supra note 13, § 19.01[2] ("A minority of courts have interpreted
[701(e) ] as a bar to admission of all materials produced by the NTSB. In the face
of longstanding contrary precedent, their holdings are open to criticism." Kreindler gives as an example, Sioux City, 780 F. Supp. at 1207.).
22 198 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Easton & Mayer, supra note 14, at 225-26.
23 Redesignation and Revision of Regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. 30,232 (Jul. 17,
1975) (codified at 49 C.F.R. Pt. 800).
24 Testimony of Board Employees, 63 Fed. Reg. 71,606 (Dec. 29, 1998) (codified at 49 C.F.R. Pt. 835).
25 Chiron, 198 F. 3d at 940.
26 Id.
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report as evidence (obtained through the normal
course of dis27
covery) but barred the NTSB accident report.
III.

COURT INTERPRETATION-INITIAL
MAJORITY RULE CASES

To find the genesis of the fact v. opinion majority rule and the
beginnings of the NTSB regulations reflecting it, one need look
no farther than the initial cases dealing with 701 (e). The first
28
known decision using 701 (e) was Ritts v. American Overseas, Inc.

The court held that 701 (e) barred reports, but not the "use of
the testimony of a witness examined by the Board in the course
of the investigation.

' 29

The court, without citing any source,

stated the most likely reason for the ban was the inability of parties in an investigation to rebut evidence as they would at a civil
trial.3 0
The court in Tansey v. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. allowed into trial the records collected by the defendant airline
during an investigation of an accident involving one of its aircraft. 1 The court specifically allowed those records used by the
company when self-reporting the accident to the CAB as well as
those used by the company in assisting the CAB in its investigation. 32 The court agreed with the Ritts decision to bar final reports from admission in court and followed the same
reasoning.3 3 As to the investigation records, the court men-

tioned the similar Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) im27 Id.

A factual report is an investigator's report of his investigation of the
accident. Because this report is not a "report of the Board," it is
not barred by the statute and is therefore admissible. As counsel
for NTSB made clear during oral argument, the only reports that
are admissible are the factual reports that investigators do, not the
Board's findings, either factual or probable cause, but what individ[T] hose reports of these factual developual investigators find ....
ments are made part of the record and parties can get that. Thus,
because investigators' reports are now plainly admissible under
agency regulations, victims have access to necessary factual information. Therefore, courts no longer need to employ an "exception"
to the statute to protect parties in litigation.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
28 Ritts v. Am. Overseas Airlines, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
29

Id. at 458.

30

Id.

97 F. Supp. 458, 461 (D.D.C. 1949).
32 Id. at 460.
33 Id. at 460-61.
31
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munity for witnesses in railroad accident reports and the cases
citing that immunity.3 4 While the court said the reasoning for
this immunity-protection to allow for frank disclosure by individuals and companies-was not "without persuasion," they
went on to dismiss it. Neither the language of the ICC nor the
CAB acts, the court felt, indicated this purpose. 5 And, the
court found no legislative history to support this purpose.6
Without clear expression of congressional intent, the court held
that the rules used for all other tort cases should apply. 7
A highly influential decision was written by the District of Columbia Circuit in Universal.3' The CAB had a regulation in place
barring expert testimony of its accident investigators in civil actions. 9 For justification, the CAB cited 701 (e).40 The court in
Universal held that accident investigator testimony was admissible when the CAB investigator was the sole source of evidence
"reasonably available to the parties."41 However, the court also
held that the CAB's reports, orders, or private papers were inadmissible.42 According to the court, conclusions or opinions of
administrative agencies, if admitted, would "usurp the function
of the jury. '43 It went on to say " [i] t is quite clear that Section
701 (e) reveals the intention to preserve the functions of court
and jury uninfluenced by the findings of the Board or
investigators."44
The Universal court's reasoning on this point of law was followed in Lobel v. American Airlines.4" The Lobel decision differed
slightly from Universal, however, by allowing the CAB investigator's factual report of his examination of the plane wreckage
into evidence as well as his deposition based on this report.46
Section 701 (e), the court wrote, was intended to guard against
the introduction of CAB opinions or conclusions "which are
34

Id. at 461.

35 Id.
36

Id.

37 Id.

38 Universal Airline, Inc. v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 188 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1951).

41

Id. at 997.
Id. at 997-98.
Id. at 999-1000.

42

Id.

39
40

at 1000.

43 Id.
44 Id.

45 Lobel v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217, 220 (2d Cir. 1951).
46 Id.
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within the functions of courts and juries to decide. 4 7 No such
views were in the investigator's factual report.4"
As Kreindler wrote, a long line of cases followed the Lobel
court's precedent.4 9 Congress is aware of the current law, including case law, when it passes legislation.5 ° Since Congress
has not changed 701 (e) significantly over time, Kreindler presumed that the majority rule cases followed congressional
51

intent.

IV.

COURT INTERPRETATION-CIVIL AERONAUTICS
BOARD AND UNIVERSAL V. EASTERN

The primary source for the Universal court's decision was a
CAB brief to the court justifying its regulations and advocating a
bar of CAB reports and CAB investigator testimony from admission in civil trials. 52 This brief was used by the court and continues to be cited as the basis for the Universaland Lobel decisions.
One reason to bar CAB reports from admission in court, stated
47 Id.
48

Id.

[T]he report consisted wholly of the investigator's personal observations about the condition of the plane after the accident. There
were in the report no opinions or conclusions about possible causes
of the accident or defendant's negligence; there were no findings
based on interviews or anything but personal observations. Nothing in the report offends either the opinion or the hearsay rule.
Sec. 701(e) was designed to guard against the introduction of
C.A.B. reports expressing agency views about matters which are
within the functions of courts and juries to decide. No such views
are reflected in this factual report.
Id. (citations omitted).
49 KREINDLER, supra note 13, at § 19.01[2].
50

Id.

51 Id.
52

Universal, 188 F.2d at 997-98.

53 Id. at 998.

The Board [CAB] advances the following five reasons for its policy
of withholding information and refusing to permit its investigators
to appear as witnesses:
'(1) the obviously correct concept that the Board had been instructed by Congress to investigate aircraft accidents solely for
the purpose of gaining the information necessary to prevent the
recurrence of similar accidents, and not for the purpose of securing evidence or providing witnesses for the benefit of parties to
private litigation,
'(2) the belief that the refusal to release information encouraged
frank disclosures on the part of the persons involved and that
such disclosures were in the public interest,
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the CAB, was the fear that conclusions from the CAB reports
would determine the civil liabilities of the parties involved in the
accident. 54 This reasoning can be found in an article published
the same year as the Universal decision written by John W. Simpson, an attorney for the CAB. He wrote that there was almost
no legislative history for 701 (e) and that this led to great uncertainty in the interpretation of the clause. 56 He cited Rhyne's legislative history for the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (1938 Act).5 7
Rhyne and Simpson did not mention any legislative history for
the 1934 Amendment to the Air Commerce Act of 1926.58 They
both mentioned that testimony given at a 1938 hearing was actually unhelpful in discerning congressional intent. 59 Simpson
'(3) the obvious undesirability of releasing a particular investigator's conclusions which might differ from the subsequent final
determination by the Board of the cause of the accident,
'(4) the fact that the conclusions of its investigators often subsequently embodied in the Board's reports would, as a practical
matter, influence the determination of the civil liabilities of the
parties involved if testified to in damage suits, contrary to the
plain purpose and intent if not the letter of section 701 (e) of the
Act, and
'(5) the number of accidents involving aircrafts was such as to
require the full time of its experts in investigating them and the
public interest dictated that the time of these experts not be consumed by appearance in courts to give testimony in private damage suits.'
What the Board sets forth as to its regulations and the provisions of
Section 701 (e) of the Civil Aeronautics Act is correct. And the reasons assigned by the Board for its policy are sound so far as the
Board and its work are concerned, but the Act and regulations referred to must be considered with reference to the governmental
function of administering justice, the judicial power, and the established practice and precedents of our system of jurisprudence.
Id.
54 Id.

55 Simpson, supra note 8, at 287.

Id. at 284.
Id. at 284 n.3.
Id. at 284; see CHARLES S. RHYNE, THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT ANNOTATED
41-51 (1939).
59 Simpson, supra note 8, at 284 n.3.
The only legislative history on this section is a statement by Mr.
Henry Allen Johnston of the Committee on Aeronautics, Association of the Bar, New York, N.Y., to the effect that accident investigation records could not be used for any purpose in any litigation.
Since there is no evidence that Congress, or even the Subcommittee, did or did not agree with his statement, it would seem to have
little or no probative value in determining the intent of Congress.
Furthermore, S. 3659 did not become law and S. 3845, which even56

57
58
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surmised that Congress enacted 701 (e) for the reason cited by
the Tansey court-administrative fact finding procedures do not
have safeguards for parties found in judicial procedures and formal rules of evidence.60 More importantly, Simpson also used
the "usurp the function of the jury" terminology found in the
Universal decision. 6 "Congress may have made Board reports
inadmissible in evidence so that the Board would not usurp the
function of the judge and jury to decide civil liabilities. 62 His
reasoning was based on a discussion of this point during the
1909 debates concerning the ICC accident report clause.63
In 1901 Congress passed an act requiring common carriers
engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the ICC.64 The history of section 701 (e) begins with a

clause from this 1901 act.65 As early as 1907, it became apparent
tually became the Civil Aeronautics Act, contained additional language making a clear distinction between the "records" and the
"reports" of the Board.
Id. (citations omitted).
60 Id. at 286.
61 Id.
62 Id.

Id. at 286 n.17; see also RHYNE, supra note 58, at 157, n.550.
Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 866, 31 Stat. 1446.
65 Id. ("Neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence
or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit
or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report."); Act
of May 6, 1910, ch. 208, 36 Stat. 350, 351 ("Neither said report nor any report of
said investigation nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for
any purpose in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report or investigation."); Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 654, 48
Stat. 1113 (amending 49 U.S.C. 172(e)) ("Neither any such statement nor any
report of such investigation or hearing, nor any part thereof, shall be admitted as
evidence or used for any purpose in any suit or action growing out of any matter
referred to in any such statement, investigation, hearing, or report thereof.");
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601 § 701(e), 52 Stat. 973, 1013 ("No part of
any report or reports of the [Air Safety] Board or the [Civil Aeronautics] Authority relating to any accident, or the investigation thereof, shall be admitted as evidence or used in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter
mentioned in such report or reports."). Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No.
85-726, § 701(e), 72 Stat. 731, 781 ("No part of any report or reports of the [Civil
Aeronautics] Board relating to any accident or the investigation thereof, shall be
admitted as evidence or used in any suit or action for damages growing out of any
matter mentioned in such report or reports."); Department of Transportation
Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931 (1966) (701(e) not included); Independent
Safety Board Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-633, 88 Stat. 2156, 2171 (1975) ("No
part of any report of the [National Transportation Safety] Board, relating to any
accident or the investigation thereof, shall be admitted as evidence or used in any
suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in such report
63
64
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to Congress that this self-reporting was insufficient for the most
serious accidents, so in 1910, Congress passed a law requiring
railroads to continue making reports of all accidents and authorizing the ICC to investigate the most serious accidents.66
Along with this responsibility, Congress authorized the ICC to
write and make public its investigation's conclusions and recommendations.67 The 1901 clause was included in the 1910 law
and covered both the railroad's self-reported accident reports
and the ICC's accident reports.6 8 It was during a 1909 debate of
this clause on the House floor that Representative Marlin Edgar
Olmsted (R - Penn.) expressed his concerns that without the
clause the reports would "substitute the finding of the Interstate
Commerce Commission-its declaration of responsibility-for
the finding of a court and jury in a damage case."69
Simpson did not say so explicitly, but without a legislative history for 701 (e) he did not have a clear link between 701 (e) and
the ICC clause. Rhyne, Simpson, Kreindler, the Tansey, Universal, and Lobel courts, and all subsequent judges and law review
article authors, save one, missed the legislative history for 701 (e)
from the 1934 Amendment to the Air Commerce Act of 1926. A
University of California second year law student named R. Bruce
Hoffe discovered this legislative history and wrote about it in
1952.70 The following analysis is the author's own, but Hoffe
should be credited for finding what so many others missed.
V.

701 (E) 1934 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

701 (e) found its first form in the 1934 Amendment to the Air
Commerce Act of 1926.71 The original 1926 Act gave the Secretary of Commerce the duty "[lt] o investigate, record, and make
public the causes of accidents in civil air navigation in the
United States. ' 72 This clause gave the Secretary great latitude in
how to perform this duty, and the Secretary began issuing full
or reports."); Act of Jul. 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745, 758 (1994)
("No part of a report of the [National Transportation Safety] Board, related to an
accident or an investigation of an accident, may be admitted into evidence or
used in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the
report.").
66 § 2, 36 Stat. at 351.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 45 CONG. REc. 153 (1909).
70 Hoffe, supra note 10, at 152-53.
71 Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 654, 48 Stat. 1113.
72 Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, § 2(e), 44 Stat. 568, 569 (1926).
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reports to the public on major accidents. 73 However, the airline
industry reacted negatively and the Secretary reverted to simply
issuing statistical reports on accidents. 4 Congress found this
unsatisfactory and began working on legislation for full reports
in 1929. 75 In 1934, the legislation became law.76
Among other things, the 1934 Amendment set out to clarify
how the Secretary of Commerce was to fulfill the duty of accident investigation reporting. At the end of any aircraft accident
investigation involving a serious or fatal injury, or when the Secretary felt it would be in the public interest, the Secretary would
make a public statement of the "probable cause or causes of the
accident. ' 77 The 1934 Amendment went on to state: " [n]either
any such statement nor any report of such investigation or hearing, nor any part thereof, shall be admitted as evidence or used
for any purpose in any suit or action growing out of any matter
referred to in any such statement, investigation, hearing, or report thereof."78
The legislative history for 1934's 701 (e) is contained in four
congressional publications:
1. The House Report for the House version (H.R. 9599) of
79
the 1934 Amendment.

2. The Senate Report for S. 3526 which became the 1934
Amendment. 80
3. The
testimony from a House committee hearing on H.R.
8
9599. 1

4. The CongressionalRecord.8 2
All four of these publications contain variations of a letter
written by Daniel C. Roper, the Secretary of Commerce at the
time.83 The House Report from the Committee on Interstate
73 NICK

A.

KOMONS, BONFIRES TO BEACONS:

UNDER THE AIR COMMERCE ACT,
74

FEDERAL CIVIL AVIATION POLICY

1926-1938, at 278 (1978).

Id. at 179.

75 Id.
76

Id. at 278.

77 Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 654, § 2, 48 Stat. 1113.
78

Id.

79 H.R. REP. No. 73-1931 (1934).
80

S. REP. No. 73-1142 (1934).

81 Air Commerce Act, 1926: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Interstate

and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 9599, 73d Cong. (1934) [hereinafter Hearings].
82 78 CONG. REC. 12,203 (1934).
83 Hearings,supra note 81, at 3-4; H.R. REP. No. 73-1931, at 1-2; S. REP. No. 731142, at 1-2; 78 CONG. REC. 12,203.
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and Foreign Commerce recommends the bill for passage," as
does the Senate Report from the Committee on Commerce., 5
According to the Congressional Record (Record), Representative
Paul Herbert Maloney (D - La.) from the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce either read from the letter
verbatim or had the text entered into the Record to answer the
question, "[w]hat section does it amend?" 6 The Record mistakes the Secretary's words for Maloney's own.8 7 Maloney also
had the letter inserted into the public record of the House Comand Foreign Commerce hearing on the
mittee on Interstate
88
1934 Amendment.
There are three sections in the letter relevant to 701 (e). First,
the letter makes clear that the amendments as a whole were not
new. The accident report clause was similar to the one under
which the ICC functioned and which dated back to 1901.9 This
is best understood in the context that the ICC already regulated
certain aspects of civil aviation, and there were even those (such
as Air Line Pilots Association President David L. Behncke) who
thought that some functions of the CAB should be transferred
to the ICC. 90
Second, the letter tied justification for the accident report
clause to another clause protecting witnesses who testified or
produced evidence for an aircraft investigation. 91 As the letter
pointed out, this witness protection clause was also not new.9932 It
was the immunities clause from the Securities Act of 1933.
Third, there was a new clause which specifically stated that no
official or employee of the Commerce Department could be required to testify based on his official role or as an expert wit84

H.R. REP. No. 73-1931, at 1.

85

S.REP. No. 73-1142, at 1.

86

78

CONG.

REc. 12,203.

87 Id.

Hearings,supra note 81, at 3-4.
Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 866, 31 Stat. 1446; Act of May 6, 1910, ch. 208, 36
Stat. 350, 351.
90 NICK A. KOMONS, THE CUTTING AIR CRASH: A CASE STUDY IN EARLY FEDERAL
AVIATION POLICY 68-9 (1973); KoNONS, supra note 73, at 278.
91 Hearings,supra note 81, at 4.
92 Id.
93 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 22(c), 48 Stat. 74, 87 (1933); Air Commerce
Act of 1926, ch. 654, § 8(2), 48 Stat. 1113, 1114 (1934) (amending 49 U.S.C.
172(e)). This immunities clause was extended to all Civil Aeronautics Authority
investigations (in addition to aircraft accident investigations) in 1938. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 1004(i), 52 Stat. 973, 1022-23.
88
89
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ness. 4 This third provision was new to both the House and
Senate bill, and would have provided the specific wording that
the trial courts later found lacking in the legislation. Hoffe
found where this text came from and why it was removed.9 5 In a
hearing before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, John H. Geisse, Chief, Manufactures Section, Aeronautic Branch, Department of Commerce,
testified that the language was based on language included in
the ICC legislation.9 6 He gave the following as the reason for
the provision:
[The ICC] desired to prevent the use of their employees as witnesses if possible, because of the amount of time that would be
spent which would seriously disrupt their performing their regular duties, if they are subjected to being called here and there
and elsewhere at procedures involving accidents. 97
A long exchange ensued between Geisse and Representative Joseph Patrick Monaghan (D - Mont.).9s Monaghan, an attorney,
had several concerns about how this provision would prevent
important, relevant evidence from being presented at trial. It
might be said he was the first in a long line of attorneys to argue
this sentiment.9 9 Geisse, not an attorney, could only respond
that the ICC had been using this provision for some time, and
the courts had supported it. 0 He promised that he would research the question with his department's attorneys and would
report back to the Committee.' °1
On June 1, he reported back to the committee. 10 2 There was
no provision barring investigators from testifying in civil actions
in the ICC legislation."0 ' Geisse discussed the issue with the ICC
and the ICC did not like its investigators testifying and avoided it
when possible. 10 4 In fact, the ICC had "educated" the railroads
not to call the investigators. 10 5 However, the ICC confirmed to
Hearings, supra note 81, at 2.
Hoffe, supra note 10, at 152-53.
96 Hearings, supra note 81, at 2.
94
95

97 Id.

98 Id. at 12-24.

at 13.
Id.
01o Id. at 24.
102 Id. at 25.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
99 Id.
100
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[74

if called, the investigators did indeed have to
Geisse that
6
testify.

10

Geisse and the committee then discussed the impact striking
this clause from the proposed legislation would have on the admissibility of accident reports in civil litigation. 10 7 The exchange
between Maloney, who would eventually report the 1934
Amendment to the House, Geisse, and Representative Pehr Gustav Holmes (R - Mass.) would have been helpful to the courts
studying 701 (e) over the years. Holmes stated that he was puzzled by the remaining provision concerning the admissibility of

accident reports in civil litigation.' 08 Geisse replied that the provision did not prohibit the investigators from testifying, and the
courts upheld this interpretation of the ICC provision barring
the admission of railroad accident reports. 09 Maloney summed
it all up by asking, "And [the Secretary of Commerce] does not
have to submit that [accident] report as evidence. Now, the
man that makes the investigation, if they choose to call him to
testify that is all right?" 110 Geisse replied yes, it was all right."'
Senator Hubert Durrett Stephens (D - Miss.) reported the
bill on behalf of the Senate Committee on Commerce with the
clause barring investigator testimony intact, but he immediately
moved to strike this provision on the floor of the Senate. 1 2 The
Senate approved, and the bill was passed without the provision
on June 13, 1934. 3 The House passed the bill without the provision on June 16, 1934. 14 Thus, both the Senate and the
House voted to enact the law without the specific wording barring investigator testimony.
The Senate committee report on the bill was ordered to be
printed May 10, 1934,115 and Geisse testified his correction to
the House committee on June 1.116 Due to this timeline, it is
probable that Senator Durrett and the Committee on Commerce were notified of the discussions between the House committee and Geisse-possibly by Geisse himself. In his correction

107

Id.
Id.

108

Id. at 26.

106

109 Id.
110 Id.
III Id.

CONG. REc.

11,326 (1934).

CONG. REc.

12,204 (1934).

112

78

113

Id.

114

78

115

Hearings, supra note 81, at 1.
Id. at 25.

116
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to the House committee, Geisse stated, "I have talked this section over with everybody concerned and the consensus of opin' 17
ion is that we will introduce no more testimony in favor of it.""
One reason for the importance of the investigator testimony
clause is that it is included with the other two clauses (the accident report clause and the witness protection/immunities
clause) in the Secretary of Commerce's justification for amendments to the law concerning aircraft investigations:
Without the provisions contained in this amendment, the Department of Commerce cannot require the submission of evidence required to determine the causes of accidents and such
evidence as is voluntarily submitted must be treated confidentially to protect the interests of the witnesses. This necessity of
refusing to give out the results of our findings in important accident cases tends to shroud such accidents in an undesirable atmosphere of mystery whereas in most cases the causes are well
known. Were the Department enabled to issue a statement of
the causes of such accidents it could dispell [sic] this air of mystery and could make available to aircraft manufacturers and operators much valuable information which would be used in the
prevention of subsequent accidents." 8
This exact paragraph' '" appears in all four versions of the letter
including those in the Senate and House reports.1 2 0 What can
be determined from the published record is that Congress voted
on the two provisions, the immunities clause, and 701 (e), with
the idea of protecting witnesses so they could provide evidence
and testimony to the CAB investigation without fear of litigation.
The justification for this protection of investigation witnesses
was that such testimony and evidence would benefit the public
interest by removing the "mystery" surrounding aircraft accidents and would also make available to the aircraft industry
(manufacturers and operators) the information necessary to
prevent future accidents occurring from the same or similar
events. This can be simply stated in three main points:
117

Id.

118Hearings, supra note 81, at 4; H.R. REP. No. 73-1931, at 2 (1934); S. RP.

No.
73-1142, at 2 (1934); 78 CONG. Rrc. 12,203 (1934).
119 The exact wording in the House Report and Subcommittee hearings starts
with "without the provisions contained in sections 2 and 9" instead of "without
the provisions contained in this amendment." Compare Hearings,supra note 81, at
4 and H.R. REP. No. 73-1931, at 2 (1934) with S. REP. No. 73-1142, at 2 (1934); 78
CONG.

REc. 12,203.

Hearings, supra note 81, at 4; H.R. REp. No. 73-1931, at 2; S. REP. No. 731142, at 2; 78 CONG. REc. 12,203.
120
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1. Full and frank disclosure-Protect investigation witnesses;
2. Transparency-Provide accident information for the public interest;
3. Safety-Prevent future accidents.
The Commerce Department and its aircraft investigation successors would later argue that the exclusionary rule included
federal employee testimony concerning investigations, and the
courts would wrestle with this issue into the future. 21 However,
as noted clearly above, Congress declined to incorporate this exact wording in 1934.122
VI.

CONCLUSION

CAB attorney John W. Simpson and the Tansey court dismissed the "full and frank disclosure" reasoning as a possible
congressional intent. 123 The Tansey court stated that there was
nothing in the legislative history to suggest Congress intended
for 701 (e) to have the same affect in the courts as the ICC clause
which had successfully precluded companies' own accident reports from being used in a number of trials. 124 Simpson added
that Congress could have done the same by simply stating so
clearly in the Civil Aeronautics Act. 125 This is true, but it is also
true that Congress barred the accident reports produced by the
Secretary of Commerce and enacted the legislation based in no
small part on Secretary Roper's letter that
clearly articulated the
26
"full and frank disclosure" argument.
The Secretary wanted to protect investigation witnesses, and I
believe the intent was to assure investigation witnesses that,
while they would have to testify during an investigation, any conclusions or opinions based on this testimony could not be used
against them in civil litigation. If their testimony and evidence
would be used at trial, they would still be able to present their
side. The Department of Commerce would get what it wanted121 See Universal Airline, Inc. v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 188 F.2d 993, 998 (D.C. Cir.
1951) ("[T]he [Civil Aeronautics] Board interprets as precluding the admission
in evidence in damage suits of expert and opinion testimony by Board investigators with respect to aircraft accidents investigated by them."); Simpson, supra
note 8, at 288-89.
122 Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 654, § 2, 48 Stat. 1113, 1113 (1934) (amending 49 U.S.C. § 172(e)).
123 Tansey v. Transcon. & W. Air, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 458, 461 (D.D.C. 1950).
124

Id.

125
126

Simpson, supra note 8, at 286.
H.R. REP. No. 73-1931, at 1-2 (1934).
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full and frank disclosure-and the witnesses would get what they
1 27
wanted: some protection regarding the use of their testimony.
This argument goes hand in hand with the idea that Congress's intent was to prevent the accident investigation reports
from usurping the function of the jury (Universal)1 28 or from
usurping the function of the judge and jury (Simpson). 129 How-

ever, Congress and the Department of Commerce did not mention this reasoning in the House Hearings, the House Report,
the Senate Report, or on the Senate or House floors when debating the 1934 Amendment. 30 Simpson was correct to point
out that this was discussed in the 1909 debates leading up to the
1910 ICC clause from which Section 701(e) evolved. 13 In fact,
his argument is strengthened by Geisse's testimony indicating
the 1934 Amendment clause came directly from the ICC
clause. 32 However, this only indicates that usurping the function of the judge and jury and the concern for full and frank
disclosure were parallel arguments and not mutually excluding
ones-at least as far as Congress was concerned the two times it
discussed and justified the clause (1909 and 1934).
Hoffe, in his 1952 law review article, indicated that he believed congressional intent concerning accident investigator testimony was muddled by the fact that the letter either read on
the House floor or entered into the CongressionalRecord by Rep33
resentative Maloney still contained the following passage:'
"Provision is also made that employees of the Department of
Commerce shall not be' 3called
upon to testify in any suit or ac4
tion involving aircraft.'

This, he thought, may have led members of the House to believe they were voting to preclude investigators from testifying at
civil trials. 35 While possibly true for some Representatives on
the House side, on the Senate side, the Senators were very
clear-the provision was struck on the floor of the Senate prior
127
128

Id. at 1-2.
Universal Airline, Inc. v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 188 F.2d 993, 1000 (D.C. Cir.

1951).
Simpson, supra note 8, at 286.
Hearings,supra note 81, at 4; H.R. REP. No. 73-1931, at 2 (1934); S. REP. No.
73-1142, at 2 (1934); 78 CONG. REc. 12,203 (1934).
131 Simpson, supra note 8, at 285 n.8.
132 Hearings, supra note 81, at 12.
133 Hoffe, supra note 10, at 153.
134 78 CONG. Rtc. 12,203 (1934).
135 Hoffe, supra note 10, at 153.
129
130
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to their vote."' One can also find evidence to indicate that
House intent was not muddled. The Senate vote occurred
before the House vote, and the House was voting on the same
piece of legislation (S. 3526).37 The text of the bill presented
on the floor of the House did not have this provision and Maloney and his fellow House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce members were clear on the matter by this time.' 38 In
any case, the main point is that all legal arguments after 701 (e)
passed have been based on the idea that no meaningful legislative history existed. One can now argue about the degree of
intent based on the understanding of all members of the
House-but this is a question of degree, not of existence.
Whether or not the Universal and Lobel courts made good policy can be (and frequently is) 13 9 argued. The fact is that the

courts in a series of cases and the NTSB in its regulations have
more or less incorporated the Universal and Lobel decisions and
made them the modern legal interpretation of 701 (e) in most
situations. However, Universal and Lobel are founded on the
myth that there was no discernible legislative history for 701 (e).
Due to the timing of the Simpson article (Simpson was a CAB
attorney at the time) and the Universal court's explicit reliance
on the CAB brief, I believe this myth emanated from the CAB
itself. 4° I am not intimating the CAB created the myth deliberately, Ijust believe they relied on Rhyne's readily available legislative history of the 1938 Act, which, unfortunately, failed to
mention the legislative history of the 1934 Amendment.14 1
Neither the CAB brief nor Simpson's influential article mentioned the legislative history of the 1934 Amendment.
Without that legislative history, the formal interpretation of
701 (e) took on a legal life of its own. It started with the courts
in Ritts and Tansey, which stated that the protection of witnesses
interviewed during CAB investigations did not appear to be the
intent of 701 (e). 42 This was solidified by the court in Universal,
which, using the CAB brief, stated that 701 (e)'s purpose was to
CONG. REc. 11,324 (1934).
78 CONG. REc. 12,204; 78 CONG. REc. 11,326.
138 78 CONG. REC. 12,203-04.
139 See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 9, at 477-78 (critiquing the Lobel court's misapplication of the Universal court's holding).
140 Simpson, supra note 8 (published in 1950); Universal Airline, Inc. v. E. Air
Lines, Inc., 188 F.2d 993, 997-98 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (decided Feb. 23, 1951).
141 See generally RHYNE, supra note 58, at 153-58.
142 Ritts v. Am. Overseas Airlines, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 457, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1947);
Tansey v. Transcon. & W. Air, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 458, 461 (D.D.C. 1950).
136
137
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prevent the replacement of the conclusions of the judge and
jury with the conclusions of the CAB. 4 ' The Lobel court cited
the Universal decision, and the justification for Universal became
the justification for the prevailing law. 4 4 Congress has left the
substance of 701 (e) untouched over the years, and the majority
rule fact v. opinion interpretation stands as the broad law today
45
with infrequent and criticized exceptions.
The court in Tansey wrote, "nothing has been found by way of
legislative history."' 4 6 This can no longer be claimed as true.
Hoffe "found" Section 701 (e)'s legislative history in 1952.
143 Universal, 188 F.2d at 1000.
144Lobel v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217, 220 (2d Cir. 1951).
145 Compare Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 701(e), 52 Stat. 973, 1013,

with 49 U.S.C. § 1154(b) (2006).
146 Tansey, 97 F. Supp. at 461.
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